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Abstract 
Many studies find that agricultural markets in developing countries are poorly integrated spatially. 
Traders’ regional arbitrage plays a key role in integrating markets across space. We investigate the 
performance of regional arbitrage and the associated obstacles for rice traders in Antananarivo, 
Madagascar. On the basis of a trader-level biweekly survey spanning 2012–2013, we find that 
traders are not fully exploiting the regional arbitrage opportunities: most of them fail to purchase 
from the cheapest district and are paying higher prices than those in the cheapest district. One 
apparent obstacle is obtaining price information from many different regions. To reduce search costs, 
we provided regional price information via SMS to randomly selected traders, but found that this had 
a null-effect on improving arbitrage performance. Traders tend to concentrate on trading with a few 
fixed districts, even if they are informed about cheaper prices in other new districts, because they 
worry about quality uncertainty and the trustworthiness of new partners. These findings suggest that 
not only transmission of price information but also issues related to produce quality and matching 
prevent the performance of arbitrage and market integration. 
 
Keywords: regional arbitrage, market integration, information friction, price information, search 
JEL code: L81, O13, Q13  
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1. Introduction 
A well-functioning agricultural market is vital for efficient marketing and distribution of food 
across time and space. When markets function well, prices would signal surpluses and deficiencies 
across regions, and induce traders to arbitrage. Through arbitrage, markets eventually clear and 
prices converge across regions to form the law-of-one-price. Well-integrated markets also enhance 
social welfare: on the production side, they provide outlets for local food production surpluses, 
preventing drops in food prices and thereby fostering incentives for producers to adopt new 
technology to increase food production and their income. On the consumption side, well-integrated 
markets protect consumers from local supply shocks by facilitating trade across spaces, leading to 
price stability (Moser et al. 2009). 
Many studies, however, find that agricultural markets are only partially integrated spatially (see 
for example Fackler and Goodwin 2001, and Sexton et al. 1991). A number of obstacles can raise 
transaction costs and prevent the full integration of agricultural markets. Among those, the 
availability of market information is often cited as one of the most crucial factors determining 
market disintegration. Indeed, a study of regional rice markets in Philippines indicates that the 
presence of substantial information frictions leads to the failure of arbitrage (Allen 2014). One 
promising technical solution to this issue is the expansion of mobile phone networks (see Aker and 
Mbiti 2010, and Nakasone et al. 2014 for a review). Evidence indicates that mobile phone coverage 
is associated with regional price convergence (Jensen 2007, 2010; Aker 2010; Aker and Fafchamps 
forthcoming) and increased search activity of agricultural traders (Tack and Aker 2014)2. A growing 
number of studies have used randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to examine the impact of providing 
market information to farmers through mobile phones3. For example, Fafchamps and Minten (2012) 
report positive effects on spatial arbitrage by traders’ selling at distant wholesale markets rather than 
at the farm-gate in India, but find no effect on price received. Nakasone (2014) finds that treated 
farmers obtained higher sales prices in Peru; however, no such effect was found in Colombia 
(Camacho and Conover 2011).  
Although these experimental studies are informative, they focus only on producers, not on the 
traders who play a major role in trade across regions. Moreover, not much is known about even the 
basic facts of traders’ arbitrage itself, despite it being a fundamental economic activity. Since spatial 
market integration can be achieved through countless transactions across space by traders who are 
motivated by profit maximization via exploiting arbitrage opportunities, understanding how and how 
well traders make actual transactions across space is critically important for determining the barriers 
                                                        
2 See also Goyal (2010) for evidence that the regional dispersion of soybean prices decreased after 
the establishment of internet kiosks that provide wholesale price information to farmers in India.  
3 In a non-experimental study, Svensson and Yanagizawa (2009) report that the market information 
broadcasted through the radio is associated with increased sales prices for farmers in Uganda. Using 
a matching method, Courtois and Subervie (forthcoming) find that farmers with access to a 
mobile-based market information service received higher prices in Ghana. 
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of market integration and formulating policies to improve the efficiency of agricultural markets.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the performance of traders’ regional arbitrage and the 
potential obstacles that prevent traders’ from making better arbitrage, where the arbitrage 
performance is measured by whether a trader purchased from the cheapest district and the gap 
between the price paid and the price in the cheapest district. In particular, we attempt to answer the 
following questions: To what regional extent do traders search and trade? How and how extensively 
do they obtain price information in various regions? Are they fully exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities? What prevents them from making a better arbitrage? Does provision of price 
information improve arbitrage performance?  
To elucidate trader’s behavior in practice, we study the case of rice traders in Madagascar. While 
rice is the country’s most important staple food, the Malagasy rice market is known to be spatially 
disintegrated, exhibiting large price dispersion over time and space. Mendoza and Randrianarisoa 
(1998) found that, in 1996–97, only 8.8% of wholesalers made purchases from areas that were more 
than 100 km away. Evidence based on the 2001 national census of communes (counties) indicates 
that rice markets in Madagascar were relatively well integrated spatially only at the subregion level, 
but not at the provincial or national level (Moser et al. 2009). Furthermore, the average probability 
of interprovincial integration of rice markets is only approximately 56%, though the degree of 
integration varies largely across provinces (Butler and Moser 2010). Studies exploiting weekly 
district-level price data after the mid-2000s find that the degree of market integration is improving 
(Miyake and Sakurai 2012), but at the same time, markets have yet to be well integrated even 
between cities near the national capital (Arimoto et al. 2014). Thus, there seems to be significant 
scope for better arbitrage.  
We collected detailed data on rice trading for 224 rice traders based in the Greater Antananarivo 
Area formed by the city center and suburb (also referred to as “Tana,” the capital of Madagascar). 
The data covered one year from August 2012 to August 2013, biweekly (every two weeks) for 27 
rounds. Additionally, to rigorously examine whether information friction is the key factor affecting 
successful arbitrage, we implemented an RCT, whereby half of the randomly selected sample traders 
were sent price information in 10 major rice-producing districts via SMS halfway through the 
survey.  
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, there is indeed scope for better arbitrage: 
many traders purchase rice from districts where prices, including transportation costs, were not the 
cheapest, and are paying much higher prices than those charged in the cheapest district. For example, 
of the traders visiting other districts to purchase the most common variety of rice (Vary gasy), only 
8% of the trader–round observations saw traders make purchases in the cheapest district, and the 
average price paid was 17% higher than the median price in the cheapest district. Second, most 
traders specialize in trading with few common districts, where they regularly visit and purchase from 
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the same trading partners, even though these districts do not always have the lowest prices. Third, 
traders are often “price blind,” meaning that they know little about prices in districts other than those 
in which they usually make purchases. Moreover, their knowledge on price is concentrated in few 
districts. Fourth, our intervention to provide regional price information had a null-effect on 
purchasing behavior and arbitrage performance. Fifth, in addition to price, traders were concerned 
about product quality and matching with trustworthy sellers. We also found that before traders start 
visiting a new district, they usually establish a “link” to that district by purchasing from sellers who 
come to sell in Tana, or asking a mediator for an introduction.  
These findings imply that traders are not fully exploiting the arbitrage opportunities, and the 
provision of price information alone is not effective in improving the situation. This is because 
traders are also concerned about non-price issues, which they overcome by limiting their trading 
districts to those in which they have “links.” Traders cannot visit a new district without this “link” 
and therefore pass up the opportunities of better arbitrage even if they are informed about cheaper 
districts.  
This study adds to our knowledge on agricultural traders’ arbitrage and marketing activities in the 
following ways: First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that directly investigates 
traders’ arbitrage and quantifies its performance in a systematic way. Second, we contribute to the 
understanding of the barriers of rice market integration in Madagascar. As discussed previously, 
existing studies have repeatedly reported that Malagasy rice markets are spatially disintegrated 
(Moser et al. 2009; Butler and Moser 2010; Miyake and Sakurai 2012; Arimoto et al. 2014). We 
support this finding by adding a direct micro-foundation that the basis of market integration, traders’ 
arbitrage, is imperfect. Third, we provide additional evidence on the impact of providing price 
information on arbitrage in developing countries. Unlike previous experimental studies that provided 
information to farmers (Fafchamps and Minten 2012; Nakasone 2014; Camacho and Conover 2011), 
we disseminate information to traders. Since traders are specialized in trading and arbitrage and bear 
the fundamental role in both regional marketing and distribution of the agricultural products, we 
believe that the provision price information to traders is more relevant for the understanding of 
agricultural market integration.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the survey and data. Section 3 presents 
descriptive evidence that traders are not fully exploiting existing arbitrage opportunities and 
discusses potential obstacles. Section 4 reports the results of the RCT and discusses why the 
provision of price information was not effective. Finally, Section 5 provides conclusions. 
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2. Survey and data 
2.1. Surveys  
The subjects of our survey are rice traders operating in Tana, Madagascar. Since we are interested 
in regional arbitrage, the population of focus is the rice traders who engage in inter-district rice trade 
(i.e., trade between Tana and districts outside Tana)4.  
The survey was conducted from June 2012 through August 2013. To create a list of rice traders, 
we first identified the geographical cluster offering a high probability of finding rice traders engaged 
in inter-district trade. We selected 44 out of 192 wards in the city center, and 17 out of a total of 40 
communes in the suburb based on five criteria5. We then created a list of rice traders by visiting 
markets and key informants in these clusters6. All the listed traders were then visited, and we 
confirmed whether they engaged in inter-district trade. We ended up with a list of 318 inter-district 
rice traders.  
In July 2012, we conducted a baseline survey to collect general information about the 
characteristics of these traders and their trading activities. Out of the 318 listed traders, 241 (76%) 
agreed to cooperate and completed the baseline survey. Then, we conducted periodic surveys every 
two weeks between August 6, 2012 and August 13, 2013, making 27 rounds in total. The periodic 
survey collected information on the following: (1) price searches; (2) details of all rice purchases, 
including information on district of purchase, transportation, price, and payment; and (3) 
management indicators such as stock, quantities of purchases and sales, average price and margin, 
and costs. Of the 241 traders who completed the baseline survey, 234 initially agreed to participate in 
the periodic survey, but 10 dropped before completion of all rounds. Our final number of sampled 
traders is thus 224 and the number of observation at the trader–round level is 6,0337.  
Finally, we conducted a follow-up survey in February 2014 to collect additional information after 
                                                        
4 Rice traders such as retailers who only purchase from wholesalers or farmers in Tana and sell at 
retail are not considered as potential subjects because they are not likely to participate in 
inter-regional arbitrage.  
5 The five criteria are (1) wards where the city’s main wholesale markets (Anosibe Andrefana and 
Andravoahangy Tsena) are located (2 wards), (2) wards surrounding those two markets where rice 
traders most likely own a shop and/or live (10 wards), (3) wards in which there is a market managed 
by Antananarivo city government (32 wards), (4) communes where traders reside according to the 
list of registered traders and wholesalers provided by the National Statistics Institute (Institut 
National de la Statistique or INSTAT, in French) (12 communes), and (5) communes located along 
the national highways that are potentially active in rice trading (5 communes). 
6 The list of traders was made by (1) visiting the ward markets for Antananarivo city and the largest 
markets in the commune for the suburbs, and listing all rice traders 
(retailers/wholesalers/traders/millers) operating in these markets; (2) visiting ward and municipality 
officials to introduce us to the largest rice traders that they know in their area, including wholesalers, 
collectors, and millers; (3) visiting millers and asking for information about traders based in the ward 
and municipality. 
7 The total number of observations at the trader–round level should be 224 ൈ 27 ൌ 6,044. We had 
11 missing trader–rounds due to refusal or questionnaire losses.  
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preliminary analyses of the periodic survey. We obtained responses from 219 out of 224 traders who 
completed the periodic survey.  
 
2.2. Intervention 
Since information friction is considered as one of the major obstacles to efficient arbitrage, we 
experimentally filled the information gap by sending regional price information via SMS to half (112 
out of 224) of the randomly selected traders after round 16 (out of 27) of the periodic survey. The 
SMS was sent on Wednesday each week. The information sent was the local price of milled rice at 
millers for the previous week8, collected by Madagascar’s Rice Observatory (Observatoire du riz or 
OdR, in French), a government agency responsible for collecting and disseminating agricultural 
commodity price information. We sent prices in the 10 most major rice-producing districts 
(Arivonimamo, Miarinarivo, Tsiroanomandidy, Ankazobe, Ambatondrazaka, Mahabo, Bealanana, 
Befandriana, Mandritsara, and Marovoay), which include distant districts in Sofia region where 
prices are generally quite cheaper than those in the major purchasing districts near Tana (see Figure 
1 and Figure 2 for map of Madagascar). We expected that this information would trigger trade with 
new districts. 
 
== Figure 1. Map of Madagascar (regions) == 
== Figure 2. Map of Madagascar (districts) == 
 
 
2.3. Modes of purchase 
We classify traders’ mode of purchase into three categories: (1) active inter-district trade, (2) 
passive inter-district trade, and (3) within-Tana trade. Inter-district trades are those between Tana and 
districts outside Tana. Active inter-district trades are purchases made outside Tana by traders actively 
visiting other districts9. On the other hand, passive inter-district trades are purchases made in Tana 
from sellers (trucks) who came from other districts to sell in Tana. Such purchases may take place at 
the traders’ store where sellers regularly come directly, or at the parking areas at major wholesale 
markets in the city center such as the Anosibe and Andravoahangy markets. On the other hand, 
within-Tana trades are those that do not directly incorporate inter-district trade but instead (1) 
purchase at the Anosibe market; (2) purchase at the Andravoahangy market; and/or (3) purchase 
                                                        
8 OdR agents collect the rice price for week 1 from Monday to Saturday. Information is then sent to 
the OdR headquarter in Tana by Monday of week 2. We receive the information from OdR Tana on 
Tuesday evening or the latest on Wednesday morning. Therefore, we are able to send the information 
to traders every Wednesday.  
9 Traders engaged in active trades are often called collectors (“collecteur” in French). 
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from local sellers in Tana such as farmers10, wholesalers, and millers. These three modes are not 
mutually exclusive, and most active inter-district traders engage in both passive inter-district trade 
and within-Tana trade.  
Note that passive inter-district trade and within-Tana trade are conducted in Tana. From the traders’ 
perspective on where to make a purchase, these two modes are alternatives once they decide to 
purchase in Tana (i.e., do not visit districts outside Tana).  
 
2.4. Price of rice 
We classify the varieties of rice into the following five categories: Vary gasy, Tsipala, Makalioka, 
imported rice, and unknown11. Vary gasy and Tsipala are the major common varieties. Makalioka is 
considered to be high grade and is the most expensive rice, mainly produced around 
Ambatondrazaka district (Alaotra-Mangoro region). Imported rice constitutes low-grade rice in 
Madagascar and usually comes from Pakistan or India.  
To be able to compare prices across districts, we converted all observed purchase prices to the 
adjusted milled-rice equivalent price (hereafter, referred to as “adjusted ME-price”), which represent 
the cost of purchasing 1 kg of milled rice, including transportation costs to Tana (recall that our 
sample traders are all based and operating in Tana) and milling fees, with adjustment for price 
differences between paddy and milled rice (see Appendix A for details). When we discuss regional 
price differences, we represent the district price by the median of actual prices paid by our sample 
traders for each variety at each survey round in each district.  
 
2.5. Measures of arbitrage performance 
We construct two indicators to measure arbitrage performance at the trader transaction (purchase) 
level. Since our sample traders are based and operating in Tana, we regard that their sales prices are 
similar; thus, we concentrate on purchase price. For each trader, we identified the cheapest purchase 
within round–activity (active or passive)–variety12. In total, we have 14,422 trader–round–activity–
variety level observations.  
The first performance measure is a dummy variable indicating whether a trader purchased from 
the cheapest district for the same round–activity–variety. The second measure is the actual–optimal 
                                                        
10 Rice cultivation is still common in Tana.  
11 Vary gasy literally means Malagasy rice, and includes any locally produced rice other than Tsipala 
and Makalioka. Some are improved varieties introduced from outside the country, but their origins 
are not known. On the other hand, Tsipala and Makalioka are more specific although they do not 
seem to be single varieties in the agronomic sense. We assume that both are improved varieties 
introduced by donors or the Ministry of Agriculture. Their appearances are quite different and they 
are easily distinguished in the market: Tsipala is relatively short and round, while Makalioka is 
relatively long.  
12 Some traders purchased rice from multiple districts. In such cases, we selected the cheapest 
purchase.  
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price ratio ߠ, defined as 
 
ߠ ൌ ݌௜௧௔௩݌௧௔௩∗ , 
 
where ݌௜௧௔௩ is the actual adjusted ME-price paid for the cheapest purchase by trader ݅ in round ݐ 
for activity ܽ in purchases for variety ݒ, and ݌௧௔௩∗  is the median of actual observed adjusted 
ME-prices in the cheapest district for the same round–activity–variety. The larger the value of ߠ, 
the greater is the gap between the optimum price and the actual purchase price—an indication of 
potential scope for better arbitrage. In both measures, for passive inter-district purchases, we count 
three modes of within-Tana trades (purchase at the Anosibe market, purchase at the Andravoahangy 
market, and purchase from local sellers in Tana) as “districts,” since these are good alternatives for 
purchase in Tana.  
 
 
3. Descriptive statistics 
3.1. Characteristics of the sample traders 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the study subjects. Out of 224 sampled traders, 104 
(46%) engaged in active inter-district trade, 209 (93%) engaged in passive inter-district trade13, and 
91 (41%) engaged in within-Tana trade during the one-year period survey. The average annual 
milled-rice equivalent volume of rice purchased was 341.8 (SD = 581.6) ton. The sample traders had 
8.2 (SD = 6.7) years of experience in rice trading. The business is somewhat diversified: 43% of the 
traders also dealt with non-food items, 16% operated a rice mill, and 21% rented out a truck or 
vehicle. As a result, the mean profit share of rice trading was 0.647 (SD = 0.311). The mean age of 
the representatives was 37.1 (SD = 9.6). Half (50%) of the sample traders are male and they are 
almost completely (99%) literate. Regarding assets, more than 80% of the traders have a store to sell 
rice and a private storage facility with a mean capacity of 28.2 (SD = 94.3) ton. Furthermore, 34% of 
the traders own a truck and 28% own a vehicle. They usually (90%) have a mobile phone.  
 
== Table 1. Summary statistics of sample traders == 
 
 
3.2. Regional extent of inter-district trade 
We define the scope of spatial arbitrage on the basis of districts where we observe actual trade by 
                                                        
13 Out of 104 active inter-district traders, 91 (88%, or 41% among all traders) also engaged in 
passive inter-district trade.  
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our sample traders. Observing actual purchases suggested that trade with that district was practically 
feasible and profitable, while districts without observed purchases were likely ones in which trade 
was not reasonable. 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the number of different districts where we observed 
actual purchases for inter-district trade, by round–activity–variety. Averaged over 27 rounds, for 
passive purchases, Vary gasy was purchased from sellers who came from 8.6 different-origin 
districts, Tsipala was purchased from those who came from 10.3 districts, and Makalioka was 
purchased from those who came from 3.6 districts, in the same round. Districts where rice was 
purchased by active inter-district trade were less diverse: Vary gasy was purchased from 7.9, Tsipala 
from 7.5, and Makalioka from 2.7 different districts on average. The number of different districts 
from which Makalioka is purchased is small because it is grown in a limited number of regions.  
 
 
== Table 2. Number of different districts purchased from in inter-district trade == 
 
 
3.3. Arbitrage performance 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of arbitrage performance. We limit our attention to the most 
common varieties, namely, Vary gasy, Tsipala, and Makalioka. In only 11.6% of the total 
observations, the purchase was made from the cheapest district (Panel A).  
Table 4 shows the degree to which traders pay more if they fail to purchase from the cheapest 
district. The table reports the mean and maximum of the district-level ratio of price in each district to 
the price in the cheapest district, averaged over rounds14. Within the same round–variety, the price 
ratios for passive inter-district trade (including within-Tana trade) are 1.078 (max = 1.159) and 1.076 
(max = 1.155) for Vary gasy and Tsipala, respectively. Similarly, the same price ratios are on average 
1.138 (max = 1.239) and 1.130 (max = 1.253) for active Vary gasy and Tsipala purchases, 
respectively. This indicates that traders visiting the “wrong” district paid 14% to 13% higher prices 
than those visiting the cheapest district, on average. 
 
== Table 3. Summary statistics on arbitrage performance == 
== Table 4. Price dispersion across purchase districts == 
 
Indeed, the actual–optimal price ratio at the transaction level (trader–round–activity–variety 
level) reported in Panel B of Table 3 is 1.072, indicating that, on average, traders paid 7.2% higher 
                                                        
14 Statistics (mean, maximum, and S.D.) were calculated for each round–activity–variety (ܰ ൌ 27 ൈ
2 ൈ 3 ൌ 162) first, and then averaged over 27 rounds. 
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prices than the median price in the cheapest district. The price premium is almost completely due to 
purchasing from a “wrong” district; if a trader purchased from the cheapest district, the average price 
premium is 0.5%.  
Comparison between active and passive trades reveals that active purchases were relatively well 
targeted toward the cheapest district: the percentage of observations of purchases made from the 
cheapest districts, aggregating all varieties, is 18.7% for active vs. 10.2% for passive. However, the 
actual–optimal price premium is twice as large as that of passive purchases (1.128 for active vs. 
1.061 for passive). This implies that although active purchases were well targeted, they were of 
lower performance than passive purchases. This is because the passive prices were relatively 
converged. The standard deviation of district-level prices within each round–activity–variety, 
averaged over rounds, is much smaller for passive trades than active trades (Table 4, column (4)). 
The relative convergence of passive prices is most likely due to competition in Tana. Therefore, the 
choice of origin district to purchase from did not make a large difference in purchase prices.  
 
3.4. Challenges for better arbitrage 
We found that the under-performance of arbitrage is largely caused by failure to visit the cheapest, 
optimal district. To identify the optimal district, Appendix Tables A1 and A2 report the median 
adjusted ME-price in each district by round–activity–variety. For example, for active purchase for 
Tsipala, we found that Marovoay and districts in Sofia (Madritsara, Bealanana, and Mampikony) 
tended to be the cheapest in the earlier rounds, whereas Ambohidratrimo, Arivonimamo, Ankazobe, 
and Tsiroanomandidy became the optimal choice in later rounds.  
The tables suggest two challenges for traders to fully exploit arbitrage opportunities. First, the 
cheapest district changes over time, and therefore, traders need to constantly track prices in several 
districts. Second, to fully exploit arbitrage opportunities, traders need to purchase from many 
different districts depending on the season. For active purchases, 11 different districts became the 
cheapest district at least once during the one-year survey period for Vary gasy and Tsipala, while 7 
different districts became the cheapest at one point for Makalioka. Passive purchases were harder as 
traders needed to purchase from 14 districts (including two purchase modes of within-Tana trade) for 
Vary gasy, 12 for Tsipala, and 9 for Makalioka.  
The first challenge calls for extensive searches, and the second challenge calls for traders to trade 
with many different districts. In the following subsections, we examine whether these two conditions 
were met.  
 
3.5. Extent of search  
How extensively are traders searching for the cheapest price? In each survey round, we asked 
11 
 
whether the trader knew the purchasing price in 36 major rice-producing districts15. Table 5 reports 
the summary statistics. Searching for prices in these rice-producing districts was common, though 
not many districts were searched. At the trader level, 95% (213/224) of the traders searched for 
prices in the listed 36 districts at least once during the survey period. Among those who did search, 
the average number of districts where they knew the price was 5.1 (SD = 3.1). At the trader–round 
level (per round, or every two weeks), searches were conducted in 76% (4,599/6,033) of the 
observations, in which traders checked the price in 2.1 (SD = 1.8) districts, on average. Active 
traders were more likely to search than passive-only traders.  
 
== Table 5. Price searches in 36 listed districts == 
 
Interestingly, traders’ knowledge on prices was concentrated in few common districts. For each 
round, we calculated the percentage of traders who searched for prices in each district, taking the 
total number of traders searched in that round as the denominator. Averaged over rounds, the most 
common district where traders knew the price was Antananarivo Renivohitra (79%), followed by 
Ambatondrazaka (46%), Miarinarivo (27%), Tsiroanomandidy (20%), and Ankazobe (19%). 
Therefore, many traders were “price-blind”; the extent of their knowledge on regional prices was 
limited.  
 
3.6. Extent of trade 
The second condition of making better arbitrage is to purchase from many different districts. We 
find that, in fact, traders tend to purchase from few fixed districts. Table 6 reports the summary 
statistics of the number of different purchase districts for inter-district trades. For active traders, we 
report the number of districts without distinguishing active and passive inter-district purchases, as 
well as the number of districts for active and passive purchases separately. Panel A of Table 6 
indicates that on average, traders purchased from 4.0 different districts during the survey period. By 
variety, Vary gasy and Tsipala were purchased from 2.5 and 2.7 different districts, respectively. 
Panel B of Table 6 reveals that, on average, traders purchased from 1.9 different districts per round, 
but for each variety, traders purchased from only one district. There were no substantial differences 
between active and passive-only traders.  
                                                        
15 The 36 districts are all 22 region capitals and 14 major rice-producing districts in Boeny, Sofia, 
Sava, and Diana regions. They are as follows: Antananarivo Renivohitra, Ankazobe, Antsirabe I, 
Tsiroanomandidy, Miarinarivo, Fianarantsoa I, Ambositra, Manakara, Farafangana, Ihosy, Toamasina 
I, Fenoarivo Atsinanana, Ambatondrazaka, Mahajanga I, Maevatanana, Marovoay, Port-Berge, 
Mandritsara, Befandriana Avaratra, Antsohihy, Bealanana, Maintirano, Mampikony, Toliara I, 
Morondava, Taolagnaro, Ambovombe, Sambava, Antsiranana I, Vohemar, Ambilobe, Ambanja, 
Other districts in Boeny, Other districts in Sofia, Other districts in Sava, and Other districts in Diana. 
We decided to specify these districts to help improve traders’ memory during interviews.  
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== Table 6. Summary statistics of the number of districts purchased == 
 
A more detailed examination of the data depicts that at the trader level, 62% of passive-only 
traders and 60% of active traders purchased Vary gasy from at most two different districts 
throughout the year. Similarly, 46% of passive-only traders and 58% of active traders did so for 
Tsipala. For the purchase of Makalioka, 80% of the passive-only traders and 70% of the active 
traders purchased from only one district, which was almost exclusively Ambatondrazaka, the major 
production region of Makalioka. At the trader–round level, almost all traders concentrated on 
purchasing each variety from a single district. These facts imply that more than half of the traders 
switched between only two districts per variety throughout the year.  
Traders not only tend to operate in only a few districts, but these districts tend to be common 
across traders. Tables A3–A6 in the Appendix report the percentages of traders who purchased from 
each district, taking the total trader–district observations for each round–activity–variety as the 
denominator. Districts attracting more traders per round are highlighted in dark red. We immediately 
recognize that the traders’ purchases were concentrated in two to three districts for active 
inter-district trade. Origin districts for passive purchases (including within-Tana trades) were 
relatively more dispersed, but still concentrated in around four districts.  
These common districts were, however, not always the cheapest districts to purchase in. In Tables 
A3–A6, we used bold squares to mark the cheapest district on the basis of median adjusted ME-price 
for each round. If these squares match with darker red areas, then it indicates that many traders were 
indeed purchasing from the cheapest district. For active–Vary gasy purchases, Tsiroanomandidy, 
which turned out to be the cheapest in 4 out of 27 rounds, did attract many traders. However, other 
common districts such as Arivonimamo and Anjozorobe were each cheapest for only one round. 
Frequently cheapest districts such as Ankazobe (cheapest in six rounds), or Maevatanana and 
Ambatondrazaka (cheapest in five rounds) were not so popular. Active–Tsipala purchases were 
slightly well targeted, where the top three popular districts (Arivonimamo, Tsiroanomandidy, and 
Ambohidratrimo) were the cheapest in 11 out of 27 rounds. However, not many traders visited the 
northern regions such as Marovoay, Mandritsara, Bealanana, and Mampikony, which was found to 
be the cheapest district in the earlier rounds. Passive purchases were also not well targeted; the top 
four popular origins (Arivonimamo, Anjozorobe, Tsiroanomandidy, and Anosibe markets) were the 
cheapest for only six and seven rounds for Vary gasy and Tsipala, respectively. 
 
3.7. Constraints on trading with new districts 
Why do traders trade with a limited number of districts? In the follow-up survey, we asked about 
the difficulty and constraints of starting to visit a new district.  
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Nearly 60% of the traders felt some difficulties in starting to visit new districts. In response to the 
question “How hard is it to start visiting a new district you have never visited before?,” 42 among 
209 valid responses (20%) replied “very hard” and 80 (38%) replied “somewhat hard.”16  
Table 7 reports the obstacles to start visiting a new district, determined by asking the traders to 
provide three reasons. In aggregate, we obtained 582 valid responses. “Finding a trustworthy trading 
partner” was the most mentioned obstacle (25%), followed by “obtaining price information” (21%), 
“quality, variety, characteristics are uncertain” (16%), “safety” (16%), “collect necessary quantity” 
(10%), “lack of experience” (7%), and “payment will be inflexible/unable to purchase on credit” 
(3%).  
 
== Table 7. Obstacles to starting to visit a new district == 
 
Table 8 reports answers regarding the most important information needed to start visiting a new 
district. Again, we asked the traders to offer three reasons. Price information is indeed the most 
important information, comprising 33% out of the 640 aggregate valid responses. It is, however, not 
a single decisive factor. In fact, traders are also aware of “quality, variety, and characteristics” (26%), 
“contact of trading partner” (19%), and “availability (quantity) of rice” (18%).  
 
== Table 8. Most valuable information when starting to trade with a new district == 
 
In summary, descriptive evidence revealed that many traders are “price-blind,” despite 
considering price information as the major constraint and also most important to start visiting a new 
district to exploit arbitrage opportunities. This suggests that information friction is indeed one of the 
major potential factors that prevent better arbitrage. In the next section, we examine whether 
eliminating this friction improves the situation. 
 
 
4. Impact of providing price information on arbitrage performance 
In this section, we examine the impact of our price information provision on traders’ behavior and 
arbitrage performance. We estimate the following simple difference-in-differences (DID) regression: 
 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵTREAT௜ ൅ ߚଶAFTER௧ ൅ ߚଷTREAT௜ ൈ AFTER௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧, 
 
where TREAT௜ is the dummy indicating that the trader was sent an SMS, and AFTER௧ is the 
                                                        
16 The remaining responses were “Neither hard nor easy” (n = 60, 29%), “Somewhat easy” (n = 19, 
9%), and “Very easy” (n = 8, 4%). 
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dummy indicating rounds after intervention. The coefficient of interest is ߚଷ, which captures the 
average treatment effect of our intervention.  
 
4.1. Results 
The randomization was mostly successful; most of the differences in pre-intervention 
characteristics between the treatment and control groups were statistically insignificant (Appendix 
Table A7), except that traders in the treatment group were more likely to search (control 72% vs. 
treatment 80%, p < 0.001) though the number of district searched is slightly smaller (control 1.8 vs. 
treatment 1.6, p < 0.001), engage in more active inter-district trade (control 24% vs. treatment 33%, 
p < 0.001)17 and visit more districts (control 1.9 vs. 2.1, p = 0.044), but passively purchase from 
smaller number of districts (control 1.9 vs. 1.8, p = 0.024).  
Table 9 reports the estimates for search and purchasing. The unit of observation is trader–round. 
The DID estimate (ߚଷ) is positive and significant for whether a trader searched for price in other 
districts (column 1) and the number of districts for which prices were known (column 2). This 
implies that the intervention successfully improved the traders’ knowledge of prices in diverse 
districts. However, the intervention had no impact on purchasing behavior. The treated traders did 
not engage in increased active trading after intervention (column 3), and the number of districts 
purchased from in each round did not increase (columns 4 and 5).  
 
== Table 9. SMS treatment effects for search and purchasing == 
 
Table 10 reports the estimates for arbitrage performance. The unit of observation is trader–round–
activity–variety. We find no statistically significant impact on either purchases from the cheapest 
district or actual–optimal price ratio, except for a positive coefficient for actual–optimal price ratio 
for active–Vary gasy purchase, implying that the intervention worsened the arbitrage performance. 
As a consequence, the provision of price information had no impact on profits. For each round, we 
obtained a crude measure of management indicators by asking the overall quantity and average price 
of purchases and sales, and margins. The estimates reported in Table 11 indicate that the intervention 
had no impact on quantity and price of purchases and sales, and margin.  
 
== Table 10. SMS treatment effects for arbitrage performance == 
== Table 11. SMS treatment effects for management indicators == 
 
                                                        
17 To deal with these systematic differences between treatment and control groups, we conducted the 
following estimations with trader fixed-effects. The results reported in the Online Appendix were 
significantly similar to those obtained without using trader fixed-effects. 
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4.2. Discussion 
Why did the provision of price information not alter traders’ behavior and improve arbitrage 
performance? In a follow-up survey, we asked a number of questions to understand why the 
intervention had no impact.  
The first possible reason and also a potential limitation of this study is that the price information 
provided was not sufficiently reliable or timely. We asked how the traders utilized the information. 
Of the 219 respondents of the follow-up survey, 107 (49%) were in the treatment group but only 95 
(43%) actually received the price information18. Among these 95 traders, only 2 (2%) used it to visit 
new districts. However, price information was used in some other ways; 31 (33%) passed the 
information to others, 42 (44%) used it to check the adequacy of prices, and 18 (19%) used it to 
negotiate a price with a seller. This suggests that the information was considered valuable, but not 
sufficient to motivate a visit to a new district.  
Why was the information not used for a visit to a new district? Table 12 summarizes the responses 
to our asking for three reasons from those who received the information but did not use it to visit a 
new district (N = 93). In aggregate, we obtained 184 valid responses. Ignoring the rank of responses, 
one of the major reasons indicated was the inadequacy of the supplied information: “information was 
not reliable” (32%), “price may change during travel or transportation” (21%), and “information was 
not timely” (14%).  
 
== Table 12. Reasons for not using SMS price information to visit a new district == 
 
These responses are understandable given that cheap districts (mostly in Sofia region) are often far 
away and the road conditions are so poor that it takes several days or even weeks to make a round 
trip. Traders may care about road conditions because car parts wear easily with bad roads, thus 
increasing maintenance costs.  
Discussions with the traders also made us aware of the possibility of underestimating the effective 
prices in distant districts because of opportunity costs. For example, districts in Sofia region take at 
least one or two weeks to make a round trip. In contrast, popular proximate districts such as 
Arivonimamo, Tsiroanomandidy, and Anjozorobe can be visited within 3–7 days. This implies that 
traders can visit these districts twice for the same amount of time it would take to visit Sofia region 
once. Time taken for purchases is critical since traders seek to buy and sell as soon as possible to 
speed up capital turnover. Although direct transportation costs are captured in our prices, these 
hidden opportunity costs are not well accounted for, and the effective prices in Sofia region may be 
much higher than the prices used in the analyses. The prices provided were also one-week lagged.  
                                                        
18 The major reasons for those not receiving the information were changes in phone number and 
losing a SIM card.  
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In any case, this is unfortunate given that the prices we provided are by far the most detailed, 
updated, systematically collected, and reliable publicly available information that one can obtain in 
Madagascar. The prices provided are those at each district’s millers and we believe that they do 
reflect local wholesale prices. However, some traders who deeply search into remote villages and 
purchase at farm-gates might feel that the provided prices were not sufficiently informative.  
We are more interested in the second possible reason that stops traders from readily visiting a new 
district. We have already seen in section 3.6 that traders continue to visit few fixed districts (Table 6), 
and more than half of the traders traded with only two districts per rice variety. Table 12 adds to this 
by revealing that the third most indicated reason in aggregate (and next most frequently indicated 
primary reason) for not using the provided price information to visit a new region was that the 
respondents only buy from fixed place/seller (11% in aggregate, or 21% among those providing this 
as their first reason). This indicates that traders will forgo the arbitrage opportunity and stay with 
familiar trading partners, even if they are informed about a cheaper price in a new district. 
Why do traders continue to visit the same fixed districts? Section 3.7 discussed the constraints on 
visiting a new district; nearly 60% of the traders expressed having some difficulty in starting to visit 
a new district, and non-price issues such as finding a trustworthy trading partner, quality uncertainty, 
and safety were cited as the major obstacles (Table 7). While traders considered price as the most 
important information needed to start a visit to a new area, information on quality, variety, and 
characteristics, contact information on a potential trading partner, and availability of rice were also 
essential (Table 8). These facts imply that lack of price information is not the only decisive factor 
that prevents traders from visiting a new area.  
The follow-up survey also revealed that traders had established a “link” before they started 
actively visiting the most frequently visited district. Of the 90 active inter-district traders who replied 
to the follow-up survey, 46 (51%) answered that they had purchased from a seller from that district 
in Tana before actually visiting there by themselves. This “trial purchase” could serve as a device to 
check the produce quality as well as to collect information on potential sellers and their 
trustworthiness in that district. Moreover, 74 (82%) indicated that they were introduced by a 
mediator during the first visit, who was a friend/relative in that district (63%), 
retailer/wholesaler/trader in Tana (28%), or seller/trader from that district (8%).  
Once traders are “linked” to a destination, they tend to continuously and exclusively trade with 
fixed trading partners. Of the active traders, 93% (84/90) replied that they “always” (57%), “most of 
the time” (32%), or “sometimes” (4%) purchase from the same trading partners. The average number 
of partners whom traders contact in the most frequently visited district is 4.0 (SD = 5.5), where these 
partners are collectors/agents (39%, 33/84), farmers (38%), or millers (23%).  
Field interviews with the traders revealed that obtaining an introduction and establishing regular 
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relationships are crucial. First, as there are so many collectors19, farmers typically prefer to sell to a 
familiar buyer over an unfamiliar one, so that local buyers who make frequent visits to the villages 
have the advantage of getting the produce first. To compete with these local buyers, traders in Tana 
need to make frequent visits and maintain regular relationships. Second, having a regular and 
trustworthy trading partner is very important in ensuring a secure supply, as the trade does not occur 
in an open market but on an individual negotiation basis. Additionally, conflict resolution after a 
contract breach appears to be costly. To secure supply in quantity and quality, and to save time spent 
in remote villages for product collection, traders occasionally make an advance payment when they 
place an order20. Then, they visit the trading partner at a mutually agreed time for collecting the 
products. The problems that traders may encounter if the partner is not trustworthy are late delivery, 
poor quality product, side-selling, or even money loss (the partner disappears). 
These findings suggest that traders cannot readily visit a new district because they are also 
concerned about quality uncertainty and matching with sellers. Traders are able to overcome these 
issues by concentrating on trading exclusively with only a few districts, where they establish a “link” 
by paying fixed costs before starting a visit. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this study, we investigated the performance of regional arbitrage and its potential obstacles for 
the rice traders in Antananarivo, Madagascar. Our major finding is that traders are not fully 
exploiting arbitrage opportunities, and providing price information alone does not improve the 
situation. When considering a visit to a new district, traders are concerned not only about price but 
also about produce quality and characteristics, matching with trustworthy sellers, and collecting the 
necessary quantity of produce. Traders tend to concentrate on trading with a few fixed districts, 
which are often “linked” by “trial purchases” from sellers in that district or asking a mediator for an 
introduction, before starting to visit there.  
On the basis of these findings, we interpret that the key obstacle preventing better arbitrage and 
market integration is not only lack of access to price information but also non-price issues related to 
starting trade in a new district. Traders overcome these issues by trading exclusively with “linked” 
districts. Because there is a fixed cost to establish a “link,” traders cannot easily increase the number 
of the “links,” and without such “links,” they cannot readily spontaneously visit a new district in 
response to information transmitting cheaper prices. Since obtaining price information in unlinked 
districts is of little use, many traders do not have incentive to search extensively and therefore, 
become “price-blind.”  
                                                        
19 One trader said that many people entered the rice-collecting business because of the recent 
availability of funds from a microfinance institution. 
20 In our data, 16% (719/4,494) of active inter-district purchases involved an advance payment. 
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Our finding and interpretation are in line with Fafchamps and Minten (2001, 2002), who report 
that agricultural traders in Madagascar tend to narrow their extent and scope of trade. They 
emphasize trust-based relationships as the dominant contract-enforcement mechanism among grain 
traders, given that legal institutions do not play an important role in contract enforcement.  
Moreover, our experimental results showing that the price information provision had no effect on 
arbitrage behavior and purchase prices add evidence supporting the notion that price information 
alone may not be sufficient to foster better arbitrage, as suggested by some previous studies 
(Fafchamps and Minten 2012; Camacho and Conover 2011). However, other studies do find a 
positive impact of price information provision on arbitrage and increased sales prices (Nakasone 
2014; Svensson and Yanagizawa 2009). At the current stage of research, a micro–macro paradox 
seems to exist where several rigorous evidence based on RCTs indicate a null-effect or at least mixed 
evidence of market information provision at the micro level (i.e., farmers and traders), while the 
expansion of mobile phone networks does seem to foster market integration at the macro (regional) 
level (Jensen 2007; Aker 2010). Further study is required to identify the conditions in which price 
information provision improves arbitrage performance and market integration.  
The policy implication derived from our findings and interpretations is that interventions that 
mitigate non-price issues or reduce the fixed cost of establishing a new link may foster better 
arbitrage and market integration. Standards, grading, and a certification system can mitigate the 
quality issue and enable smooth transactions without a trader needing to conduct a direct on-the-spot 
inspection. Issues related to matching can be resolved by opening a periodic market at fixed focal 
locations where sellers and buyers meet regularly.  
We are aware of several limitations of our findings and interpretations. First, as discussed in detail 
in section 4.2, the null-effect of our intervention may be due to limited reliability and timeliness of 
the information provided. In any case, our price information is the best available in the context and 
there is currently no way to improve. We speculate that the traders’ perception of unreliability toward 
our prices (local millers’ price) comes from the gap with their actual purchase prices (most likely 
farm-gate price), and that such a gap is larger for those who make intensive searches in remote 
villages. Investigating the extent of this price gap and its correlation with trader characteristics may 
be an interesting topic for future research, with important implication on the choice of price in 
studying regional market integration.  
Second, our finding of arbitrage under-performance may be exaggerated if rice is more finely 
differentiated than our classification of major varieties. Primary Hedonic pricing analysis does 
indicate price differences within each variety depending on product characteristics (Sakurai and 
Arimoto 2014), which can imply that some traders may be purchasing at a higher price because the 
produce characteristics or quality is different. How suppliers, traders, and consumers recognize and 
evaluate variety, quality, and other characteristics is an important question that remains to be 
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understood in Madagascar’s rice market.  
Third, our study sample is limited to traders in Tana, who are buyers. Traders based in production 
districts acting as sellers may behave differently; therefore, we should be cautious when generalizing 
our findings and interpretations.  
Given the first limitation on price information provided, while we safely claim that the provision 
of the best price information currently available in Madagascar to rice traders did not improve 
arbitrage performance, we do not interpret and assert that our result provides conclusive evidence 
that transmitting market information is meaningless or that information friction is not a major 
obstacle to improving arbitrage. In fact, supporting descriptive evidence does suggest the importance 
of information friction. However, we also emphasize the presence of obstacles other than 
information friction, and call for attention to non-price factors such as quality uncertainty and 
matching to improve arbitrage and develop efficient agricultural markets.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of sample traders 
 
 
Variable Source Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
or n or %
Rice trading
Engaged in active inter‐district trade, 2012–13 (dummy) Periodic 224 104 46.4% 0 1
Engaged in passive inter‐district trade, 2012–13 (dummy) Periodic 224 209 93.3% 0 1
Engaged in within‐Tana trade, 2012–13 (dummy) Periodic 224 198 88.4% 0 1
 (within‐Tana trade) Purchased at Anosibe market (dummy) Periodic 198 129 65.2% 0 1
 (within‐Tana trade) Purchased at Androavoahangy market (dummy) Periodic 198 49 24.7% 0 1
 (within‐Tana trade) Purchased from local sellers in Tana (dummy) Periodic 198 140 70.7% 0 1
Total amount of rice purchased, 2012–13 (milled‐rice equivalent, ton) Periodic 224 341.8 581.6 0 6749.6
Number of workers engaged in rice trading Baseline 224 5.4 4.2 1 49
Years running rice trading Baseline 224 8.2 6.7 1 32
Have updated "carte collecter" (dummy) Baseline 224 82 36.6% 0 1
Pay wholesale tax (dummy) Baseline 224 152 67.9% 0 1
Keep income statements  (dummy) Baseline 224 90 40.2% 0 1
Sell imported rice (dummy) Baseline 224 173 77.2% 0 1
Business diversification
Sell food other than rice (dummy) Baseline 224 156 69.6% 0 1
Sell non‐food items (dummy) Baseline 224 97 43.3% 0 1
Operate rice mill (dummy) Baseline 224 36 16.1% 0 1
Rent out truck or vehicle (dummy) Baseline 224 47 21.0% 0 1
Profit share of rice trading Baseline 222 0.647 0.311 0.02 1
Representative
Representative's age Baseline 220 37.1 9.6 20 69
Representative is male (dummy) Baseline 224 111 49.6% 0 1
Representative is literate (dummy) Baseline 224 221 98.7% 0 1
Representative's education level (dummy)
  None Baseline 221 2 0.9% 0 1
  Primary Baseline 221 42 19.0% 0 1
  Lower secondary Baseline 221 79 35.7% 0 1
  Upper secondary Baseline 221 61 27.6% 0 1
  Higher Baseline 221 37 16.7% 0 1
Asset
Have store for selling rice (dummy) Baseline 224 186 83.0% 0 1
Have private storage (dummy) Baseline 224 194 86.6% 0 1
Total capacity of private storage (ton) Baseline 224 28.2 94.3 0 1000
Own vehicle (dummy) Baseline 221 61 27.6% 0 1
Own truck (dummy) Baseline 224 77 34.4% 0 1
Own cell phone (dummy) Baseline 223 201 90.1% 0 1
Use mobile money for general purpose (dummy) Baseline 223 24 10.8% 0 1
Use mobile money for rice trading (dummy) Baseline 223 6 2.7% 0 1
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Table 2. Number of different districts purchased from in inter-district trade  
 
Note: “Number of different districts purchased from” is the number of different districts in which our 
sampled traders made actual purchases. The unit of observation is round–activity–variety (ܰ ൌ 27 ൈ
2 ൈ 3 ൌ 162). The summary statistics are calculated over rounds (N = 27).  
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics on arbitrage performance 
 
Note: The unit of observation is trader–round–activity–variety.  
 
Activity Variety Mean S.D.  Min Max
Vary gasy 8.6 1.2 7 11
Tsipala 10.3 1.7 8 15
Makalioka 3.6 1.4 2 8
Vary gasy 7.9 1.5 4 11
Tsipala 7.5 1.6 5 11
Makalioka 2.7 1.6 1 7
Passive
Active
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
or n or %
A. Dummy if purchased from the cheapest district
All transactions 14,422 1,675 11.6% 0 1
Passive inter‐district trades (incl. within‐Tana trades) 11,954 1,214 10.2% 0 1
  Vary gasy 4,130 264 6.4% 0 1
  Tsipala 3,619 336 9.3% 0 1
  Makalioka 4,205 614 14.6% 0 1
Active inter‐district trades 2,468 461 18.7% 0 1
  Vary gasy 969 93 9.6% 0 1
  Tsipala 783 102 13.0% 0 1
  Makalioka 716 266 37.2% 0 1
B. Actual–optimal price ratio
All transactions 14,422 1.072 0.099 0.638 2.509
  If purchased from the optimal district 1,675 1.005 0.057 0.680 1.480
  If not purchased from the cheapest district 12,747 1.081 0.100 0.638 2.509
Passive inter‐district trades (incl. within‐Tana trades) 11,954 1.061 0.070 0.729 1.759
  Vary gasy 4,130 1.071 0.083 0.743 1.759
  Tsipala 3,619 1.073 0.070 0.729 1.653
  Makalioka 4,205 1.040 0.050 0.790 1.386
Active inter‐district trades 2,468 1.128 0.171 0.638 2.509
  Vary gasy 969 1.143 0.165 0.680 1.847
  Tsipala 783 1.108 0.112 0.788 1.891
  Makalioka 716 1.129 0.224 0.638 2.509
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Table 4. Price dispersion across purchase districts 
 
Note: All statistics (mean, max, and S.D.) are calculated for each round–activity–variety (ܰ ൌ 27 ൈ
2 ൈ 3 ൌ 162) based on district-level price, and then averaged over 27 rounds. “Number of districts 
purchased from” is the number of different districts where we observed actual purchases made by 
our sampled traders. For passive purchases, three modes of within-Tana trade are also considered as 
“districts.” “Price ratio compared to the cheapest district” represents the ratio of price in each district 
to the price in the cheapest district. “Adjusted ME-price” (S.D.) in column (4) is the standard 
deviation of district prices within each round–activity–variety.  
 
 
Table 5. Price searches in 36 listed districts 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Adjusted
districts ME‐price
Activity Variety purchased Mean Max S.D.
Vary gasy 11.6 1.078 1.159 50.3
Tsipala 13.3 1.076 1.155 51.4
Makalioka 6.6 1.043 1.080 34.0
Vary gasy 7.9 1.138 1.239 79.9
Tsipala 7.5 1.130 1.253 104.5
Makalioka 2.7 1.093 1.162 98.7
Price ratio compared to
the cheapest district
Passive
(incl. within‐Tana trade)
Active
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
or n or %
A. Trader level
Searched price in 36 listed districts (dummy)
  All traders 224 213 95.1% 0 1
  Passive‐only traders 120 109 90.8% 0 1
  Active traders 104 104 100.0% 0 1
(If searched) Number of districts searched price
  All traders 213 5.1 3.1 1 20
  Passive‐only traders 109 4.5 3.0 1 12
  Active traders 104 5.8 3.1 1 20
B. Trader‐round level (per round)
Searched price in 36 listed districts (dummy)
  All traders 6,033 4,599 76.2% 0 1
  Passive‐only traders 4,405 3,030 68.8% 0 1
  Active traders 1,628 1,569 96.4% 0 1
(If searched) Number of districts searched price
  All traders 4,599 2.1 1.8 1 12
  Passive‐only traders 3,030 2.0 1.9 1 11
  Active traders 1,569 2.3 1.6 1 12
27 
 
 
Table 6. Summary statistics of the number of districts purchased from in inter-district trade 
 
Note: Number of districts purchased from does not include the three modes of within-Tana trade.  
 
Variety Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
A. Trader level
All varieties 222 4.0 1.9 1 10 118 4.2 2.2 1 10 104 3.8 1.7 1 10 91 3.2 1.5 1 7 104 2.3 1.5 1 10
Vary gasy 212 2.5 1.2 1 7 112 2.4 1.3 1 7 100 2.5 1.2 1 7 81 2.1 1.0 1 6 87 1.8 1.1 1 6
Tsipala 200 2.7 1.5 1 8 107 2.9 1.7 1 8 93 2.5 1.3 1 6 75 2.2 1.1 1 5 81 1.7 1.0 1 6
Makalioka 210 1.3 0.6 1 4 114 1.2 0.5 1 4 96 1.3 0.6 1 3 78 1.2 0.5 1 3 66 1.2 0.5 1 3
Import 61 1.1 0.3 1 2 38 1.1 0.2 1 2 23 1.2 0.4 1 2 20 1.1 0.3 1 2 6 1.3 0.5 1 2
Don't know 19 1.3 0.6 1 3 5 1.0 0.0 1 1 14 1.4 0.6 1 3 6 1.0 0.0 1 1 9 1.4 0.5 1 2
B. Trader‐round level (per round)
All varieties 5,221 1.9 0.8 1 6 2,783 2.1 0.7 1 6 2,438 1.6 0.7 1 6 1,373 1.4 0.6 1 4 1,628 1.3 0.6 1 5
Vary gasy 3,990 1.0 0.2 1 3 2,311 1.0 0.2 1 3 1,679 1.0 0.2 1 3 762 1.0 0.2 1 2 969 1.0 0.2 1 3
Tsipala 3,526 1.0 0.2 1 3 2,169 1.0 0.2 1 3 1,357 1.1 0.2 1 3 603 1.0 0.2 1 2 785 1.1 0.3 1 3
Makalioka 4,139 1.0 0.1 1 2 2,451 1.0 0.1 1 2 1,688 1.0 0.1 1 2 989 1.0 0.1 1 2 716 1.0 0.1 1 2
Import 331 1.0 0.0 1 1 163 1.0 0.0 1 1 168 1.0 0.0 1 1 77 1.0 0.0 1 1 91 1.0 0.0 1 1
Don't know 33 1.2 0.4 1 2 10 1.0 0.0 1 1 23 1.2 0.4 1 2 6 1.0 0.0 1 1 17 1.3 0.5 1 2
Active purchase
Active tradersTrader types
All traders Passive‐only traders Active traders Passive purchase
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Table 7. Obstacles to starting to visit a new district 
 
Note: Based on the follow-up survey. Respondents are all traders who participated in the follow-up 
survey (N = 219). 
 
 
Table 8. Most valuable information when starting to trade with a new district 
 
Note: Based on the follow-up survey. Respondents are all traders who participated in the follow-up 
survey (N = 219). 
 
 
Total First Second Third
Obtaining price information 21.1% 24.1% 17.8% 21.4%
Collect necessary quantity 9.8% 8.4% 9.6% 11.5%
Finding trustworthy trading partner 25.1% 30.0% 25.9% 18.7%
Payment will be inflexible / unable to purchase on credit 3.4% 1.0% 5.6% 3.8%
Quality, variety, characteristics is uncertain 16.3% 7.4% 23.4% 18.7%
Safety 16.2% 18.7% 11.7% 18.1%
Lack of experience 7.4% 10.3% 5.1% 6.6%
Lack of money 0.5% 0.0% 1.0% 0.5%
Other 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Obs. 582 203 197 182
Total First Second Third
Price 33.0% 51.1% 29.4% 17.2%
Availability (quantity) 18.1% 6.8% 24.8% 23.2%
Quality, variety, and characteristics 26.1% 22.8% 30.3% 25.1%
Contact of trading partner 19.1% 16.0% 13.3% 28.6%
Safety information 1.4% 2.7% 0.5% 1.0%
Road condition 1.3% 0.5% 0.9% 2.5%
Credit information 0.5% 0.0% 0.9% 0.5%
Other 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Obs. 640 219 218 203
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Table 9. SMS treatment effects for search and purchasing 
 
Note: Unit of observation is trader–round. Standard errors clustered by trader in parentheses. Round 
fixed effects included. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of  Number of  Number of 
Searched price districts Engaged in  active passive
in other knowing active districts districts
districts price trading purchased purchased
Treatment 0.0810 0.0213 0.0981 ‐0.0152 ‐0.0736
(0.0500) (0.115) (0.0503) (0.0950) (0.0888)
After ‐0.136*** ‐0.587*** ‐0.0492 0.0712 0.0160
(0.0262) (0.169) (0.0271) (0.109) (0.0793)
Treatment x After 0.0753*** 1.504*** ‐0.00880 ‐0.136 ‐0.00130
(0.0215) (0.217) (0.0221) (0.0924) (0.0484)
Constant 0.834*** 1.771*** 0.281*** 1.374*** 1.826***
(0.0342) (0.116) (0.0375) (0.106) (0.0839)
N 6033 6033 6033 1628 4156
R‐sq 0.025 0.125 0.018 0.026 0.009
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Table 10. SMS treatment effects for arbitrage performance 
 
Note: Unit of observation is trader–round–activity–variety. Standard errors clustered by trader in parentheses. Round fixed effects included. * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Vary gasy Vary gasy Vary gasy
& Tsipala Vary gasy Tsipala & Tsipala Vary gasy Tsipala & Tsipala Vary gasy Tsipala
Panel A. Dummy if purchased from cheapest district
Treatment 0.017 0.0114 0.0252 0.0218 0.0122 0.0182 0.0094 0.00865 0.0121
‐0.00991 ‐0.0109 ‐0.0149 ‐0.0192 ‐0.025 ‐0.0292 ‐0.00849 ‐0.0107 ‐0.0123
After 0.107*** ‐0.00719 0.246*** 0.0131 ‐0.0252 0.0488 0.121*** ‐0.00632 0.276***
‐0.0213 ‐0.0177 ‐0.0389 ‐0.0404 ‐0.0574 ‐0.057 ‐0.0239 ‐0.0173 ‐0.0443
Treatment x After ‐0.0349 ‐0.0151 ‐0.0598 0.0109 0.00607 0.0325 ‐0.0333 ‐0.0143 ‐0.059
‐0.0212 ‐0.0163 ‐0.0337 ‐0.0343 ‐0.0377 ‐0.0512 ‐0.0225 ‐0.0174 ‐0.0352
Variety (base = Vary gasy)
  Tsipala 0.0287*** 0.0335* 0.0284***
‐0.00737 ‐0.0148 ‐0.00831
Constant 0.00125 0.0299* ‐0.00745 ‐0.00336 0.0404 ‐0.0108 0.00518 0.0282 0.00204
‐0.0107 ‐0.0145 ‐0.0103 ‐0.025 ‐0.0381 ‐0.0175 ‐0.0115 ‐0.0152 ‐0.0105
N 9501 5099 4402 1752 969 783 7749 4130 3619
R‐sq 0.05 0.059 0.092 0.128 0.144 0.371 0.078 0.095 0.153
Panel B. Actual–optimal price ratio
Treatment ‐0.00478 ‐0.00434 ‐0.00668 ‐0.00992 ‐0.00454 ‐0.0200 ‐0.00572 ‐0.00694 ‐0.00481
(0.00496) (0.00505) (0.00620) (0.0133) (0.0122) (0.0180) (0.00441) (0.00414) (0.00577)
After ‐0.0560*** ‐0.0433*** ‐0.0736*** ‐0.117*** ‐0.151*** ‐0.0815* ‐0.0354*** ‐0.0141* ‐0.0635***
(0.00852) (0.00881) (0.0104) (0.0294) (0.0309) (0.0316) (0.00523) (0.00626) (0.00626)
Treatment x After 0.0138 0.0169 0.0114 0.0361 0.0460* 0.0382 0.00557 0.00727 0.00416
(0.00779) (0.00866) (0.00825) (0.0208) (0.0232) (0.0234) (0.00712) (0.00777) (0.00744)
Variety (base = Vary gasy)
  Tsipala ‐0.00581* ‐0.0366*** 0.00155
(0.00239) (0.00734) (0.00187)
Constant 1.099*** 1.078*** 1.121*** 1.219*** 1.192*** 1.216*** 1.066*** 1.048*** 1.092***
(0.00785) (0.00762) (0.00943) (0.0244) (0.0237) (0.0309) (0.00441) (0.00516) (0.00520)
N 9501 5099 4402 1752 969 783 7749 4130 3619
R‐sq 0.158 0.321 0.117 0.305 0.694 0.395 0.228 0.453 0.163
All transactions Active transactions Passive transactions
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Table 11. SMS treatment effects for management indicators 
 
Note: Unit of observation is trader–round. Standard errors clustered by trader in parentheses. Round 
fixed effects included. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Reasons for not using SMS price information to visit a new district 
 
Note: Based on the follow-up survey. Respondents are traders who received our price information 
via SMS and did not use this information to start a visit to a new district (n = 93). 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Biweekly Biweekly Selling  Purchasing Margin
amount amount price price
sold (ton) purchased (ton)  (Ar/kg)  (Ar/kg)  (Ar/kg)
Treatment 5.866 5.701 ‐3.030 ‐5.496 0.383
(3.113) (3.248) (8.786) (8.618) (3.593)
After 2.054 ‐0.0435 103.8*** 108.3*** ‐0.891
(1.734) (1.739) (6.739) (6.709) (3.294)
Treatment x After ‐2.179 ‐2.188 ‐5.529 ‐2.184 ‐0.721
(1.127) (1.180) (7.762) (7.202) (2.280)
Constant 8.260*** 11.91*** 1125.5*** 1069.0*** 52.56***
(1.656) (1.905) (6.245) (6.355) (3.145)
N 5769 5862 5830 5716 5814
R‐sq 0.012 0.011 0.274 0.280 0.007
Total First Second Third
Information was not timely 14.1% 3.3% 15.0% 42.4%
Information was not reliable 31.5% 34.1% 38.3% 12.1%
Price may change during travel or transportation 20.7% 13.2% 35.0% 15.2%
Price is not important 6.0% 2.2% 3.3% 21.2%
SMS price was expensive 3.8% 7.7% 0.0% 0.0%
Bad transportation 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0%
Lack of money 1.1% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Only buy from fixed place/seller 11.4% 20.9% 1.7% 3.0%
Other 10.9% 16.5% 6.7% 3.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Obs. 184 91 60 33
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Appendix A. Imputation of (adjusted) milled-rice equivalent price  
In this Appendix, we describe how we imputed and adjusted the purchase price of rice. The main 
concern is that a certain fraction of purchases were made in paddy, and the price for paddy is 
generally lesser than that for milled rice because paddy needs to be processed. To obtain 
comparability between the two prices, we construct a milled-rice equivalent price (hereafter, 
ME-price), which represents the price equivalent to purchasing milled rice per kg, including 
transportation costs and milling fees.  
When the purchased rice is milled rice, the ME-price is simply the raw purchase price plus 
transportation costs. For purchases made in paddy, we impute the ME-price on the basis of the 
following equation: 
 
݌̂୫୧୪୪ୣୢ ൌ
݌୮ୟୢୢ୷ ൅ ߬ ൅ ܿ െ ߙୠ୰ୟ୬݌ୠ୰ୟ୬
ߙ୫୧୪୪ୣୢ  
 
where ݌୮ୟୢୢ୷ is the purchase price of paddy, ߬ is the transportation cost (of paddy), ܿ is the 
milling fee (per kg of paddy), ߙ୮ୟୢୢ୷ and ߙୠ୰ୟ୬ are the conversion rates from paddy to milled rice 
and paddy to bran, respectively, and ݌ୠ୰ୟ୬ is the sales price of bran. All prices and costs are 
measured per kg. The numerator is the total cost of purchasing 1 kg of paddy, net of sales of bran. 
The denominator is the quantity of milled rice obtained from 1 kg of paddy.  
For all purchases made during the periodic surveys, we have information on ݌୮ୟୢୢ୷ and ߬ but 
not on the others. We thus collected information on the rest of the parameters 
(ܿ, ߙୠ୰ୟ୬, ߙ୫୧୪୪ୣୢ, ݌ୠ୰ୟ୬) in the follow-up survey. Out of 219 respondents in the follow-up survey, 70 
(32%) purchased rice in paddy. For those who purchased in paddy, we asked about the details of 
milling for each variety, obtaining 133 trader–variety observations. Table OA1 and Table OA2 in 
the online appendix present the summary statistics. Of the 130 available observations, 110 (85%) 
were milled in Antananarivo Renivohitra. For milling cost ܿ, we use the milling fee in low season21. 
It is common for the traders to obtain and sell the bran. Out of 133 trader–variety observations, 52% 
were milled by the trader, thus retaining the bran. Even where a trader asked a miller to carry out the 
milling, the trader answered that they “always get the bran” in 71% of the observations. This 
indicates that the traders obtained the bran in 86% (ൌ 0.52 ൅ ሺ1 െ 0.52ሻ ൈ 0.71) of the cases. The 
bran is almost always sold (89%). We therefore assume that when traders purchase paddy, they get 
the bran and sell it, which requires bran sales to be deducted from the purchase cost.  
To impute ݌̂୫୧୪୪ୣୢ, we use the median of variety-specific parameter (Table OA2). Suppose a 
                                                        
21 The milling fee for low season (non-harvest season: September to April) is higher than that in the 
high season (harvest season: May to August), though the difference is marginal. The fee for the high 
season is lower because of higher operation costs and competition. However, millers make up for 
these with the increase in operation volumes. 
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trader purchased Vary gasy in paddy at a price of 780 Ar/kg and transportation cost of 20 Ar/kg. 
Then, the imputed ME-price per kg is  
 
݌̂୫୧୪୪ୣୢ ൌ
݌୮ୟୢୢ୷ ൅ ߬ ൅ ܿ െ ߙୠ୰ୟ୬݌ୠ୰ୟ୬
ߙ୫୧୪୪ୣୢ ൌ
780 ൅ 20 ൅ 20 െ 0.10 ൈ 600
0.70 ൌ 1,086. 
 
Thus, purchasing 1,000 kg of paddy at a price of 780 Ar/kg and transportation cost of 20 Ar/kg is 
equivalent to purchasing 700 kg of milled rice at a price of 1,086 Ar/kg (including transportation 
cost). 
Since the ME-price is imputed for purchase in paddy, we checked whether it is systematically 
different from the purchase prices for milled rice. Fixed effect estimates of ME-prices with a dummy 
indicating purchase in paddy, with activity–round–variety–district fixed effects and using all 19,422 
purchased prices for Vary gasy, Tsipala, and Makalioka, indicate that the ME-price in paddy is 127.9 
Ar/kg lower than the price of milled rice (Table OA3 column (1)). The constant (i.e., the price for 
milled rice) is 1210.2, which indicates that paddy is 9.9% (ൌ 1 െ ሺ1210.2 െ 127.9ሻ/1210.2) 
cheaper than milled rice.  
This price difference between paddy and milled rice might cause a bias. Out of the 1,339 activity–
round–variety–district observations, 248 (19%) were for purchased in paddy only, 748 (56%) were 
for purchased in milled rice only, and 343 (26%) were for purchased both in-paddy and milled rice 
(Table OA4). The percentage of purchases in paddy only is larger for active inter-district trades than 
passive trades (49% vs. 2%), implying that the potential bias, if any, is more serious for active 
purchases.  
To take into account this potential bias, we construct the adjusted milled-rice equivalent price, 
which adjusts the price difference between paddy and milled rice by adding the paddy’s price 
discount compared to milled rice for purchases in paddy. We estimate the price discount for each 
activity–variety by regressing the ME-price price with a dummy indicating purchase in paddy with 
round–district fixed effects (Table OA3 columns (2)–(7)). The adjusted ME-price is constructed by 
adding the activity–variety specific price discount. For example, the price discount is 1190.5 Ar/kg 
for active–Vary gasy purchases. Thus, the adjusted ME-price of Vary gasy in paddy with a price of 
780 Ar/kg and transportation cost of 20 Ar/kg is 
 
݌̂୫୧୪୪ୣୢୟୢ୨. ൌ 1,086 ൅ 119.5 ൌ 1205.5. 
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Appendix Tables 
Table A1. Median adjusted milled-rice price by round–variety–district (passive incl. within-Tana trade) 
 
Variety District \ Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Vary gasy Ambohidratrimo 1000 1150 1260 1300 1130 1195 1290 1295 1280 1265 1230 1270 1270 1250 1255 1230 1260 1145 1240 1025 1180 1175 1170 1180 1120
Vary gasy Ankazobe 1018 1080 1080 1140 1260 1295 1160 1200 1255 1290 1280 1260 1210 1250 1250 1250 1240 1255 1240 1260 1080 1250 1180 1190 1190 1240 1170
Vary gasy Arivonimamo 1060 1080 1125 1180 1240 1200 1200 1200 1220 1210 1200 1220 1220 1275 1280 1250 1250 1170 1160 1140 1150 1135 1140 1140 1150 1140 1150
Vary gasy Manjakandriana 1323 1300
Vary gasy Anjozorobe 1055 1070 1100 1150 1180 1240 1240 1240 1180 1170 1190 1180 1200 1250 1300 1290 1300 1275 1180 1102 1075 1060 1132 1175 1180 1219 1180
Vary gasy Ambatolampy 960 960
Vary gasy Tsiroanomandidy 1026 1041 1100 1200 1160 1195 1190 1189 1180 1200 1190 1190 1200 1280 1280 1280 1200 1100 1100 1090 1080 1080 1090 1105 1160 1120 1130
Vary gasy Miarinarivo 1080 1100 1095 1100 1280 1305 1200 1210 1210 1220 1240 1255 1190 1290 1290 1245 1250 1240 1240 1265 1245 1220 1135 1210 1250 1205
Vary gasy Soavinandriana 1260
Vary gasy Antananarivo Atsimondrano 1050 1120 1100 1150 1260 1220 1180 1160 1200 1160 1180 1250 1280 1180 1240 1140 1200 1200 1180 1180 1180 1160
Vary gasy Toamasina I 1250
Vary gasy Ambatondrazaka 1000 1000 1040 1125 1180 1195 1169 1185 1018 1190 1180 1195 1180 1350 1300 1240 1380 1300 996 1289 1220
Vary gasy Andilamena 1140
Vary gasy Marovoay 1160 1160 1160 1160 960
Vary gasy Mandritsara 1080 1080 1150 1190
Vary gasy Befandriana Avaratra 1220
Vary gasy Bealanana 1080 1240 1389 1389 1230 1354 1250 1263 1250 1240 1220 1220
Vary gasy Mampikony 1518
Vary gasy Other districts in Boeny 1100
Vary gasy Tana: Anosibe 1090 1070 1110 1180 1220 1210 1150 1200 1280 1200 1220 1250 1300 1350 1290 1280 1250 1260 1200 1115 1100 1130 1120 1140 1143 1140 1135
Vary gasy Tana: Andravoahangy 1100 1080 1080 1165 1180 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1250 1325 1290 1240 1220 1205 1140 1100 1100 1125 1120 1180 1160 1140 1190
Vary gasy Tana: Seller in Tana 1040 1050 1050 1080 1180 1180 1146 1200 1220 1220 1220 1190 1300 1300 1300 1295 1250 1270 1120 1100 1080 1080 1100 1175 1180 1180 1170
Tsipala Ambohidratrimo 1140 1260 1290 1160 1190 1290 1290 1265 1260 1240 1255 1300 1260 1250 1220 1250 1250 1250 1230 1200 1195 1180 1120 1160
Tsipala Ankazobe 1000 1039 1080 1140 1270 1285 1135 1190 1290 1290 1260 1250 1200 1255 1220 1270 1250 1240 1250 1250 1240 1250 1190 1190 1175 1245 1160
Tsipala Arivonimamo 1050 1070 1150 1160 1180 1200 1180 1200 1200 1200 1180 1220 1200 1200 1200 1220 1240 1210 1200 1140 1155 1220 1140 1140 1166 1150 1160
Tsipala Anjozorobe 1035 1070 1080 1150 1170 1270 1220 1230 1140 1140 1170 1170 1180 1180 1180 1280 1280 1300 1280 1240 1200 1180 1175 1250 1180 1250 1180
Tsipala Tsiroanomandidy 1020 1050 1080 1150 1180 1140 1155 1180 1172 1160 1200 1140 1200 1260 1200 1200 1155 1100 1100 1090 1060 1060 1065 1080 1125 1120 1120
Tsipala Miarinarivo 1060 1100 1100 1280 1305 1180 1200 1200 1200 1250 1250 1220 1200 1225 1245 1265 1238 1175 1230 1253 1235 1225 1200 1225 1240 1160
Tsipala Soavinandriana 1040 1140 1250 1200 1080 1080 1060 1080
Tsipala Antananarivo Atsimondrano 1050 1120 1120 1150 1260 1220 1160 1140 1180 1140 1180 1250 1270 1160 1240 1120 1160 1200 1160 1160 1160 1160
Tsipala Fianarantsoa I 1160
Tsipala Ambatondrazaka 1100 1060 1105 1180 1250 1200 1200 1230 1200 1040 1080 1230
Tsipala Mahajanga I 1050
Tsipala Marovoay 990 1029 980 1160 1200 1200 1130 1100 1100 1100 1155 1250 1130
Tsipala Port‐Berge 1150
Tsipala Mandritsara 1050 1050 1040 1110 1120 1100 1130 1100 1100 1110 1100 1120 1160 1200 1190 1100 1040 1070 1080 1110 1140 1160
Tsipala Befandriana Avaratra 980 1020 1020 1080 1100 1100 1090 1245
Tsipala Antsohihy 1000 1100
Tsipala Bealanana 985 1030 1080 1120 1160 1180 1140 1135 1150 1115 1140 1150 1180 1200 1200 1180 1150 1200 1100 1040 1070 1220 1240 1140 1155
Tsipala Mampikony 980 1200 1332 1200 1140
Tsipala Other districts in Boeny 950
Tsipala Tana: Anosibe 1040 1050 1095 1170 1220 1230 1160 1215 1210 1215 1210 1230 1260 1240 1310 1300 1250 1265 1190 1110 1110 1135 1110 1140 1150 1140 1135
Tsipala Tana: Andravoahangy 1080 1130 1080 1160 1200 1170 1160 1195 1150 1140 1180 1175 1190 1210 1215 1260 1270 1165 1120 1060 1100 1150 1120 1150 1160 1150 1120
Tsipala Tana: Seller in Tana 1050 1060 1060 1150 1160 1160 1160 1200 1200 1180 1200 1340 1390 1260 1295 1250 1276 1020 1060 1080 1080 1070 1150 1180 1180 1180
Makalioka Ambohidratrimo 1400 1260
Makalioka Ankazobe 1200 1100
Makalioka Arivonimamo 1090 1060 1160 1240 1265 1250 1300 1270 1200 1280 1310 1320 1375 1420 1400 1380 1400 1400 1300 1300
Makalioka Anjozorobe 1120 1120 1200 1296 1320 1230 1221 1300 1290 1125 1300 1214
Makalioka Tsiroanomandidy 1100 1100 1280 1350 1370 1300
Makalioka Antananarivo Atsimondrano 1160 1160 1200 1290 1340 1260 1290 1290 1280 1290 1300 1350 1380 1370 1380 1380 1350 1260 1290 1340 1280 1285 1295 1285
Makalioka Ambatondrazaka 1100 1120 1190 1220 1250 1270 1260 1270 1280 1280 1300 1300 1360 1400 1400 1410 1420 1380 1380 1350 1300 1240 1240 1248 1250 1250 1250
Makalioka Mahajanga I 1050
Makalioka Marovoay 1100 1200 1200 1200
Makalioka Tana: Anosibe 1100 1100 1150 1250 1275 1275 1250 1280 1290 1300 1320 1340 1380 1410 1400 1425 1430 1450 1400 1300 1290 1355 1260 1300 1340 1270 1295
Makalioka Tana: Andravoahangy 1130 1050 1190 1200 1250 1280 1270 1260 1280 1270 1300 1320 1375 1440 1440 1450 1420 1430 1400 1250 1260 1260 1200 1200 1210 1250 1300
Makalioka Tana: Seller in Tana 1140 1100 1120 1240 1260 1280 1275 1270 1270 1285 1320 1340 1410 1420 1415 1440 1440 1445 1400 1380 1275 1240 1240 1270 1260 1270 1300
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TableA2. Median adjusted milled-rice price by round–variety–district (active) 
 
Notes for Table A1 and Table A2: Each price is the median price for all observed paid prices in each round–activity–variety–district. The price is based on 
the adjusted milled-rice equivalent price. The cheapest district for each round–variety is highlighted in red. 
Variety District \ Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Vary gasy Ambohidratrimo 1070 1100 1130 1255 1299 1138 1160 1221 1280 1263 1190 1220 1225 1260 1203 1240 1133 1200 1170 1140 1070 1080 1110 1120
Vary gasy Ankazobe 1020 1062 1062 1091 1205 1134 1200 1203 1205 1230 1200 1220 1213 920 920 1210 848 948 948 1105 1123 1090
Vary gasy Arivonimamo 1020 1028 1120 1150 1210 1245 1270 1210 1195 1230 1190 1160 1170 1230 1230 1230 1230 1240 1205 1170 1085 1110 1100 1120 1125 1120 1150
Vary gasy Anjozorobe 1062 1062 1084 1134 1177 1205 1205 1212 1205 1212 1205 1262 1262 1234 1005 1020 1062 1091 1091 1105 1134 1191 1177
Vary gasy Antsirabe I 1020
Vary gasy Ambatolampy 962 962 962 962 962
Vary gasy Tsiroanomandidy 1091 1010 1205 1234 1205 1205 1234 1234 1220 1177 1205 1155 1177 1277 1205 1205 1212 862 1162 1077 1077 1077 1105 1112 1134 1170 1166
Vary gasy Miarinarivo 1020 1205 1140 1160 1205 1348 1134 1205 1205 1191 1191 1205 1241 1062 1062 1062 1062 991 991 1062 1062 1134 1134 1177
Vary gasy Soavinandriana 877 1205 1205 762
Vary gasy Toamasina I 1115 1115
Vary gasy Ambatondrazaka 1070 1020 1062 1070 1291 1148 1305 1305 1205 1348 1020 1091 1420 777 1062 1205
Vary gasy Mahajanga I 920 920
Vary gasy Maevatanana 1205 1062 1205 1205 1205 1277 1277 1205 1305 1305 1134 1134 1205 1205 920 920 1120 1120 1062
Vary gasy Marovoay 1220
Vary gasy Mandritsara 1241
Vary gasy Befandriana Avaratra 1320
Vary gasy Bealanana 1205 1300 1300 1320 1320 1334 1334 1277 1077 1148 1105 1205 1177
Vary gasy Mampikony 1120
Vary gasy Ambanja 1348
Tsipala Ambohidratrimo 1100 1100 1100 1255 1294 1128 1135 1160 1290 1268 1185 1220 1225 1270 1203 1245 1215 1190 1160 1145 1065 1095 1105
Tsipala Ankazobe 992 1190 1200 1240 1200 1210 1218 1205 1200 1152 930 1020 1135 1016
Tsipala Arivonimamo 1020 1038 1120 1168 1170 1210 1260 1200 1185 1188 1163 1150 1170 1190 1220 1220 1220 1230 1205 1155 1070 1110 1090 1120 1115 1117 1153
Tsipala Anjozorobe 1112 1162 1266 1288 1288 1288 1466 1045
Tsipala Tsiroanomandidy 1100 1066 1195 1266 1266 1309 1223 1266 1202 1123 1123 1209 1209 1266 1238 1166 1252 1138 1223 1223 1088 1052 1152 1173 1216 1216 1209
Tsipala Miarinarivo 1020 1020 1130 1140 1266 1409 1195 1252 1252 1230 1302 1123 1266 1409 1138 1052 1052 1080 1123 1123 1166 1195 1238
Tsipala Soavinandriana 980 1266 1045 966
Tsipala Fianarantsoa I 1290 1290
Tsipala Ambatondrazaka 1280 1309 1266
Tsipala Marovoay 873 1009 1016 1395 1295 1380 1395 1395 1395 1395 1466 1509 1466 1509 1538 1466 1466 966 1180 1180 1180 1252
Tsipala Mandritsara 1000 1040 1240 1140 1120 1150 1150 1250
Tsipala Befandriana Avaratra 1423
Tsipala Bealanana 935 975 1238 1309 1280 1290 1300 1409 1409 1402 1409 1138 1195 1152 1238 1230
Tsipala Mampikony 887 995 1016 1140 1295 1280 1380 1395 1395 1395 1395 1466 1509 1466 1538 1552 1466 1466 909 1173 1123
Makalioka Arivonimamo 1065 1095 1130 1230 1270 1290 1290 1295
Makalioka Anjozorobe 1099 1099 1099 1110 1150 1150 1217 1217 1026 1099 1173 1209 878 952
Makalioka Ambatolampy 1217 1217
Makalioka Tsiroanomandidy 1300
Makalioka Miarinarivo 673
Makalioka Soavinandriana 790
Makalioka Amparafaravola 980 1110 1210 1230 1084 1099 1099 1114 1128 1128 1305 1364 1276 1158 1128 1261 1276
Makalioka Ambatondrazaka 1026 1055 1114 1187 1187 1187 1270 1320 1224 1246 1237 1246 1290 1393 1467 1467 1496 1496 1380 1408 1170 1246 1136 1143 1143 1158 1151
Makalioka Andilamena 864
Makalioka Marovoay 768
Makalioka Mampikony 614
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Table A3. Percentage of traders purchasing from each district (active, Vary gasy) 
 
Note: The numerator is the number of traders purchasing from each district. The denominator is the total trader–district purchased. Districts with a higher 
percentage of purchasing traders for each round are highlighted in dark red. The cheapest district based on median adjusted ME-price for each round–
variety is marked by a bold square.  
District \ Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Ambohidratrimo 0% 2% 7% 10% 4% 5% 0% 7% 8% 8% 9% 10% 8% 0% 8% 5% 6% 9% 8% 5% 3% 7% 6% 6% 7% 5% 3%
Ankazobe 6% 2% 2% 2% 2% 0% 3% 0% 3% 4% 2% 3% 5% 0% 0% 0% 3% 9% 3% 5% 9% 7% 8% 6% 2% 5% 3%
Arivonimamo 26% 33% 39% 36% 40% 46% 47% 41% 39% 35% 42% 45% 41% 54% 48% 43% 45% 41% 32% 22% 26% 34% 25% 23% 24% 24% 22%
Anjozorobe 19% 22% 22% 21% 23% 20% 18% 18% 21% 21% 12% 13% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 8% 10% 18% 17% 19% 20% 17% 21% 24%
Antsirabe I 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Ambatolampy 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 3% 5% 3% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Tsiroanomandidy 28% 20% 15% 21% 19% 22% 15% 23% 18% 13% 21% 19% 31% 35% 28% 29% 26% 23% 37% 49% 38% 32% 28% 37% 39% 34% 43%
Miarinarivo 9% 7% 5% 2% 2% 2% 3% 0% 0% 2% 2% 3% 3% 8% 4% 14% 3% 5% 5% 5% 3% 0% 6% 9% 5% 3% 3%
Soavinandriana 4% 0% 2% 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Toamasina I 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Ambatondrazaka 4% 4% 2% 2% 6% 0% 9% 7% 3% 8% 2% 0% 5% 0% 8% 5% 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 3% 0%
Mahajanga I 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Maevatanana 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 3% 2% 2% 0% 3% 4% 0% 0% 3% 5% 3% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 3% 3%
Marovoay 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Mandritsara 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Befandriana Avaratra 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Bealanana 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 2% 5% 4% 7% 6% 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 2% 3% 0% 2% 3% 0%
Mampikony 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Ambanja 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total trader–district 47 45 41 42 48 41 34 44 38 48 43 31 39 26 25 21 31 22 38 41 34 41 36 35 41 38 37
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Table A4. Percentage of traders purchasing from each district (active, Tsipala) 
 
Note: The numerator is the number of traders purchasing from each district. The denominator is the total trader–district purchased. Districts with a higher 
percentage of purchasing traders for each round are highlighted in dark red. The cheapest district based on median adjusted ME-price for each round–
variety is marked by a bold square.  
District \ Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Ambohidratrimo 0% 3% 5% 6% 6% 5% 0% 9% 10% 12% 16% 11% 8% 0% 9% 4% 8% 8% 7% 3% 3% 6% 7% 7% 6% 7% 0%
Ankazobe 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 3% 0% 4% 8% 0% 0% 0% 4% 8% 0% 3% 9% 9% 10% 3% 0% 3% 6%
Arivonimamo 30% 53% 59% 59% 64% 49% 58% 66% 65% 59% 63% 64% 65% 79% 52% 56% 50% 46% 27% 29% 41% 38% 40% 37% 47% 50% 52%
Anjozorobe 5% 6% 3% 3% 6% 3% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Tsiroanomandidy 32% 17% 13% 6% 8% 21% 19% 13% 6% 6% 3% 4% 8% 5% 26% 20% 23% 29% 50% 51% 34% 38% 30% 43% 38% 30% 35%
Miarinarivo 9% 3% 5% 3% 3% 3% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 4% 5% 4% 12% 8% 4% 10% 6% 6% 3% 3% 7% 3% 3% 3%
Soavinandriana 2% 0% 3% 6% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fianarantsoa I 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Ambatondrazaka 0% 0% 3% 0% 6% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Marovoay 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 5% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 0% 3% 3% 0% 3% 3% 3% 3% 0% 3%
Mandritsara 5% 3% 0% 3% 0% 3% 4% 0% 0% 3% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Befandriana Avaratra 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Bealanana 5% 8% 5% 9% 0% 3% 4% 3% 10% 6% 9% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 3% 3% 0% 3% 3% 0%
Mampikony 7% 6% 3% 3% 6% 5% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 5% 4% 0% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 0% 3% 0% 0% 3% 0%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total trader–district 44 36 39 34 36 39 26 32 31 34 32 28 26 19 23 25 26 24 30 35 32 32 30 30 32 30 31
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Table A5. Percentage of traders purchasing from each district (passive incl. within-Tana trade, Vary gasy) 
 
Note: The numerator is the number of traders purchasing from each district. The denominator is the total trader–district purchased. Three modes of 
within-Tana trade are included. Districts with a higher percentage of purchasing traders for each round are highlighted in dark red. The cheapest district for 
each round–variety is marked by a bold square.  
 
District \ Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Ambohidratrimo 1% 0% 0% 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 2% 1% 1% 5% 5% 4% 2% 2% 2% 1% 3% 2% 3% 3% 1% 1% 2%
Ankazobe 6% 5% 4% 3% 3% 3% 5% 5% 5% 7% 3% 6% 5% 3% 6% 5% 6% 6% 5% 6% 14% 3% 5% 5% 4% 4% 6%
Arivonimamo 24% 24% 21% 25% 29% 34% 38% 33% 29% 30% 32% 25% 24% 27% 25% 24% 21% 20% 26% 22% 16% 19% 22% 18% 23% 20% 20%
Manjakandriana 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Anjozorobe 18% 21% 22% 21% 22% 20% 21% 23% 23% 22% 28% 27% 22% 21% 20% 21% 20% 19% 20% 21% 20% 23% 23% 21% 26% 24% 20%
Ambatolampy 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Tsiroanomandidy 13% 10% 14% 16% 10% 4% 4% 9% 12% 10% 8% 13% 11% 8% 9% 11% 12% 15% 20% 16% 17% 19% 15% 18% 13% 20% 22%
Miarinarivo 3% 1% 3% 1% 1% 1% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 2% 1% 1% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 4% 2% 3% 5%
Soavinandriana 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Antananarivo Atsimondrano 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Toamasina I 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Ambatondrazaka 3% 5% 3% 3% 1% 1% 1% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0%
Andilamena 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Marovoay 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0%
Mandritsara 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Befandriana Avaratra 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Bealanana 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 4% 3% 1% 2% 3% 4% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Mampikony 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other districts in Boeny 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Tana: Anosibe 18% 15% 18% 14% 13% 19% 11% 11% 15% 11% 13% 14% 12% 12% 16% 11% 16% 15% 11% 14% 15% 14% 17% 18% 17% 16% 13%
Tana: Andravoahangy 4% 3% 4% 5% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 6% 5% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 5% 2% 4% 3% 5% 4% 6% 4% 5% 4%
Tana: Seller in Tana 10% 15% 11% 9% 11% 7% 4% 3% 3% 5% 3% 2% 15% 18% 13% 18% 17% 15% 10% 10% 9% 10% 8% 6% 8% 6% 8%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total trader–district 164 164 156 154 156 149 160 166 162 152 151 150 171 177 179 169 168 170 168 180 172 182 164 169 157 157 172
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Table A6. Percentage of traders purchasing from each district (passive incl. within-Tana trade, Tsipala) 
 
Note: The numerator is the number of traders purchasing from each district. The denominator is the total trader–district purchased. Three modes of 
within-Tana trade are included. Districts with a higher percentage of purchasing traders for each round are highlighted in dark red. The cheapest district for 
each round–variety is marked by a bold square.  
District \ Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Ambohidratrimo 0% 0% 0% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 1% 1% 6% 4% 3% 3% 1% 3% 1% 3% 2% 3% 3% 1% 1% 1%
Ankazobe 6% 5% 3% 3% 2% 3% 4% 5% 4% 5% 4% 6% 3% 3% 5% 5% 4% 7% 4% 5% 6% 3% 3% 4% 3% 4% 6%
Arivonimamo 25% 20% 21% 27% 37% 30% 37% 35% 30% 31% 29% 28% 34% 40% 29% 25% 25% 19% 20% 18% 20% 18% 21% 18% 16% 24% 27%
Anjozorobe 3% 13% 9% 12% 12% 11% 11% 14% 11% 10% 14% 12% 11% 12% 9% 10% 10% 11% 12% 13% 11% 9% 11% 10% 13% 10% 10%
Tsiroanomandidy 18% 19% 10% 11% 9% 7% 7% 6% 10% 6% 4% 6% 5% 4% 8% 14% 14% 23% 30% 26% 29% 31% 23% 30% 27% 31% 26%
Miarinarivo 4% 1% 2% 0% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 3% 3% 1% 4% 5% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 2% 6%
Soavinandriana 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0%
Antananarivo Atsimondrano 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Fianarantsoa I 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Ambatondrazaka 2% 2% 2% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 2% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%
Mahajanga I 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Marovoay 2% 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
Port‐Berge 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Mandritsara 1% 1% 6% 4% 4% 6% 6% 6% 6% 3% 4% 3% 1% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 2% 2% 3% 4% 4% 1% 1% 0% 0%
Befandriana Avaratra 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Antsohihy 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Bealanana 4% 6% 12% 7% 4% 8% 11% 11% 11% 19% 18% 20% 12% 8% 9% 9% 7% 4% 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 3% 3% 0% 0%
Mampikony 2% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other districts in Boeny 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Tana: Anosibe 19% 13% 19% 20% 13% 18% 13% 14% 16% 10% 15% 16% 14% 11% 14% 12% 15% 15% 10% 16% 17% 16% 18% 19% 21% 19% 14%
Tana: Andravoahangy 4% 1% 2% 2% 1% 3% 1% 2% 1% 4% 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 3% 1% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 1%
Tana: Seller in Tana 6% 15% 12% 9% 10% 6% 3% 0% 2% 2% 2% 1% 9% 12% 16% 16% 19% 15% 9% 9% 6% 9% 7% 5% 9% 5% 8%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total trader–district 126 141 126 138 134 139 139 131 141 134 137 127 153 139 159 153 151 149 156 154 150 157 145 150 141 139 144
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Table A7. Balancing test of randomization 
 
 
Note: p-value of Welch's two sample t-test on the equality of means reported. 
 
Control Treatment Difference
( C ) ( T ) ( T‐C ) p ‐value
Search and trade (periodic, trader–round level, pre‐treatment)
Searched price in 36 listed districts (dummy) 0.723 0.804 0.081 0.000
(If searched)  Number of districts searched price 1.794 1.640 ‐0.154 0.000
Engage in active inter‐district rice trading (dummy) 0.236 0.334 0.098 0.000
(If yes) Number of districts purchased 1.944 2.077 0.133 0.044
Engage in passive inter‐district rice trading (dummy) 0.815 0.836 0.020 0.123
(If yes) Number of districts purchased 1.877 1.804 ‐0.073 0.024
Rice trading (baseline)
Number of workers engaged in rice trading 5.0 5.7 0.6 0.260
Years running rice trading 7.2 9.2 2.0 0.024
Have updated "carte collecter" (dummy) 0.304 0.429 0.125 0.052
Pay wholesale tax (dummy) 0.688 0.670 ‐0.018 0.776
Keep income statements  (dummy) 0.438 0.366 ‐0.071 0.278
Sell imported rice (dummy) 0.741 0.804 0.063 0.267
Business diversification (baseline)
Sell food other than rice (dummy) 0.688 0.705 0.018 0.773
Sell non‐food items (dummy) 0.438 0.429 ‐0.009 0.893
Operate rice mill (dummy) 0.170 0.152 ‐0.018 0.717
Rent out truck or vehicle (dummy) 0.259 0.161 ‐0.098 0.072
Profit share of rice trading 0.647 0.647 0.000 0.991
Characteristics of the representative (baseline)
Representative's age 37.1 37.1 0.0 0.983
Representative is male (dummy) 0.482 0.509 0.027 0.690
Representative is literate (dummy) 0.973 1.000 0.027 0.083
Representative's education level (dummy)
  None 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.995
  Primary 0.189 0.191 0.002 0.974
  Lower secondary 0.351 0.364 0.012 0.850
  Upper secondary 0.279 0.273 ‐0.007 0.914
  Higher 0.171 0.164 ‐0.008 0.881
Asset (baseline)
Have store for selling rice (dummy) 0.821 0.839 0.018 0.723
Have private storage (dummy) 0.902 0.830 ‐0.071 0.118
Total capacity of private storage (ton) 22.6 33.8 11.2 0.376
Own vehicle (dummy) 0.255 0.297 0.043 0.479
Own truck (dummy) 0.304 0.384 0.080 0.207
Own cell phone (dummy) 0.901 0.902 0.001 0.982
Use mobile money for general purpuse (dummy) 0.099 0.116 0.017 0.684
Use mobile money for rice trading (dummy) 0.009 0.045 0.036 0.101
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Online Appendix 
 
Table OA1. Summary statistics of milling 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
or n or %
Variety
  Vary gasy 133 53 39.8% 0 1
  Tsipala 133 30 22.6% 0 1
  Makalioka 133 50 37.6% 0 1
Paddy–milled rice conversion rate (%) 133 69.2 3.6 50 85
Milled by the trader (dummy) 132 68 51.5% 0 1
(If ask the miller to mill the paddy)
Milling fee (low season) 63 21.3 5.4 7 40
Milling fee (high season) 64 20.7 4.8 5 30
Usually get bran?
  Yes, always 55 39 70.9% 0 1
  Yes, most of the time 55 0 0.0% 0 1
  Yes, sometimes 55 4 7.3% 0 1
  No, always the miller 55 12 21.8% 0 1
(All traders who purchased paddy in the last year)
Paddy–bran conversion rate (%) 119 11.7 4.5 5 30
Sell bran? (dummy) 116 103 88.8% 0 1
(If yes)  Sales price of bran (Ar/kg) 107 636.1 137.7 250 850
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Table OA2. Summary statistics of milling by variety 
 
 
 
Table OA3: Difference in milled-rice equivalent price between paddy and milled rice 
 
Note: Unit of observation is purchase. Standard errors clustered at activity–round–variety–district in 
column (1) and at round–variety level in columns (2)–(7). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
 
 
Stats. Vary gasy Tsipala Makalioka All varieties
Obs. 53 30 50 133
Paddy–milled rice conversion rate (%) Mean 70.8 70.3 66.9 69.2
Median 70.0 70.0 68.0 69.0
Milling fee (low season) Mean 19.8 20.0 23.8 21.3
Median 20.0 20.0 22.0 20.0
Milling fee (high season) Mean 19.4 19.6 23.0 20.7
Median 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
Paddy–bran conversion rate (%) Mean 10.6 11.5 13.0 11.7
Median 10.0 10.0 12.5 10.0
Sales price of bran (Ar/kg) Mean 620.7 671.7 633.2 636.1
Median 600.0 680.0 650.0 650.0
Milled by the trader (dummy) 0.472 0.567 0.531 0.515
Sell bran? (dummy) 0.936 0.885 0.837 0.888
Usually get bran?
  Yes, always 76.9% 55.6% 70.0% 70.9%
  Yes, most of the time 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
  Yes, sometimes 7.7% 0.0% 10.0% 7.3%
  No, always the miller 15.4% 44.4% 20.0% 21.8%
  Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
  Obs.  26 9 20 55
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Passive Passive Passive Active Active Active
purchases Vary gasy Tsipala Makalioka Vary gasy Tsipala Makalioka
Paddy ‐129.0*** ‐160.4*** ‐168.8*** ‐127.0*** ‐119.5*** ‐191.9*** ‐12.51
(6.951) (9.627) (21.50) (11.18) (16.62) (19.15) (12.96)
Constant 1210.4*** 1179.3*** 1169.2*** 1285.1*** 1152.1*** 1179.2*** 1222.0***
(1.243) (0.821) (0.687) (0.318) (9.798) (7.203) (10.91)
Activity–round–variety–district FE Yes No No No No No No
Round–district FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 19422 5298 4538 5100 1801 1268 1417
R‐sq 0.169 0.320 0.205 0.149 0.131 0.259 0.002
43 
 
Table OA4: Summary statistics of milled–rice equivalent prices  
 
Note: Unit of observation is activity–round–variety–district. 
 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
or n or %
Mean milled‐rice equivalent price (Ar/kg) 1,339 1155.3 120.9 601.3 1453.3
Mean adjusted milled‐rice equivalent price (Ar/kg) 1,339 1188.9 107.6 613.8 1551.9
Median milled‐rice equivalent price (Ar/kg) 1,339 1157.0 124.2 601.3 1483.6
Median adjusted milled‐rice equivalent price (Ar/kg) 1,339 1188.9 111.0 613.8 1551.9
Mode of purchase
  Inter‐district, active 1,339 487 36.4% 0 1
  Inter‐district, passive 1,339 610 45.6% 0 1
  Within‐district 1,339 242 18.1% 0 1
Variety
  Vary gasy 1,339 528 39.4% 0 1
  Tsipala 1,339 558 41.7% 0 1
  Makalioka 1,339 253 18.9% 0 1
Fraction of observations purchased in milled rice 1,339 0.737 0.405 0 1
Activity–round–variety–district observations with: 
  Paddy only 1,339 248 18.5% 0 1
  Paddy and milled rice 1,339 343 25.6% 0 1
  Milled rice only 1,339 748 55.9% 0 1
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Table OA5: SMS treatment effects for search and purchasing with trader fixed-effects 
 
Note: Unit of observation is trader–round–activity–variety. Standard errors clustered by trader in 
parentheses. Round fixed effects included. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of  Number of  Number of 
Searched price districts Engaged in  active passive
in other knowing active districts districts
districts price trading purchased purchased
After ‐0.140*** ‐0.208 ‐0.0630* ‐0.189* 0.0377
(0.0266) (0.148) (0.0260) (0.0752) (0.0716)
Treatment x After 0.0746*** 1.500*** ‐0.00797 ‐0.125 ‐0.0335
(0.0215) (0.217) (0.0221) (0.0784) (0.0441)
Constant 0.875*** 1.782*** 0.331*** 1.386*** 1.784***
(0.0202) (0.0912) (0.0199) (0.0616) (0.0532)
N 6033 6033 6033 1628 4156
R‐sq 0.029 0.140 0.020 0.042 0.018
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Table OA6: SMS treatment effects for arbitrage performance with trader fixed-effects 
 
Note: Unit of observation is trader–round–activity–variety. Standard errors clustered by trader in parentheses. Round fixed effects included. * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Vary gasy Vary gasy Vary gasy
& Tsipala Vary gasy Tsipala & Tsipala Vary gasy Tsipala & Tsipala Vary gasy Tsipala
Panel A. Dummy if purchased from cheapest district
After 0.0599** 0.0168 0.260*** 0.0424 0.160 0.281* 0.227*** 0.187*** 0.338***
(0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0389) (0.0518) (0.108) (0.115) (0.0264) (0.0345) (0.0471)
Treatment x After ‐0.0338 ‐0.0158 ‐0.0600 0.0194 0.0186 0.0526 ‐0.0342 ‐0.0155 ‐0.0603
(0.0214) (0.0160) (0.0344) (0.0381) (0.0416) (0.0596) (0.0230) (0.0175) (0.0365)
Variety (base = Vary gasy)
  Tsipala 0.0317*** 0.0497*** 0.0288***
(0.00699) (0.0132) (0.00793)
Constant 0.00241 0.0326** ‐0.00885 ‐0.00251 0.0520 ‐0.0271 0.00335 0.0238* 0.0000908
(0.0102) (0.0112) (0.00980) (0.0257) (0.0360) (0.0230) (0.0111) (0.0104) (0.0118)
N 9501 5099 4402 1752 969 783 7749 4130 3619
R‐sq 0.054 0.066 0.104 0.130 0.166 0.380 0.083 0.106 0.171
Panel B. Actual–optimal price ratio
(0.00496) (0.00505) (0.00620) (0.0133) (0.0122) (0.0180) (0.00441) (0.00414) (0.00577)
After ‐0.0490*** ‐0.0362*** ‐0.0741*** ‐0.0311 0.128** ‐0.124** ‐0.0449*** ‐0.00370 ‐0.0469***
(0.00910) (0.0106) (0.0101) (0.0337) (0.0469) (0.0378) (0.00554) (0.00680) (0.00651)
Treatment x After 0.0127 0.0168 0.0101 0.0305 0.0440 0.0349 0.00600 0.00911 0.00283
(0.00763) (0.00858) (0.00774) (0.0230) (0.0249) (0.0256) (0.00703) (0.00781) (0.00704)
Variety (base = Vary gasy)
  Tsipala ‐0.00653** ‐0.0440*** 0.000179
(0.00217) (0.00689) (0.00166)
Constant 1.099*** 1.076*** 1.121*** 1.223*** 1.191*** 1.211*** 1.066*** 1.046*** 1.091***
(0.00656) (0.00641) (0.00764) (0.0198) (0.0215) (0.0255) (0.00430) (0.00468) (0.00473)
N 9501 5099 4402 1752 969 783 7749 4130 3619
R‐sq 0.180 0.364 0.153 0.331 0.753 0.477 0.293 0.550 0.247
Active transactions Passive transactionsAll transactions
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Table OA7: SMS treatment effects for management indicators with trader fixed-effects 
 
Note: Unit of observation is trader–round–activity–variety. Standard errors clustered by trader in 
parentheses. Round fixed effects included. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Biweekly Biweekly Selling  Purchasing Margin
amount amount price price
sold (ton) purchased (ton)  (Ar/kg)  (Ar/kg)  (Ar/kg)
After 2.959 0.499 162.3*** 233.8*** 2.336
(2.199) (1.525) (9.585) (7.351) (3.369)
Treatment x After ‐2.153 ‐2.031 ‐7.900 ‐5.964 ‐0.803
(1.134) (1.169) (7.545) (6.911) (2.281)
Constant 11.22*** 14.71*** 1125.2*** 1066.0*** 53.60***
(1.060) (1.184) (4.392) (4.398) (2.256)
N 5769 5862 5830 5716 5814
R‐sq 0.008 0.009 0.462 0.460 0.017
